Preface
Prior to 2000, LNG as a means of providing natural gas was mainly confined to markets lacking alternative supply options, and was elsewhere considered as a 'niche' supply source. In the early to mid-2000s this began to change as the growth in gas demand in importing regions continued and LNG supply sources such as Trinidad and Tobago and later Qatar were developed at a cost level which allowed LNG to compete in markets formerly dominated by pipeline gas. Between 2004 and 2009 the economic growth surge experienced by the BRICS and their commodity import and investment requirements served to increase the price of oil and other commodities but also the unit investment costs in capital intensive industries. These costs almost doubled in real terms during this period. On the face of it the impact on liquefaction plant costs appeared to be significantly more pronounced.
Since 2010 regional natural gas prices have diverged. US prices have been generally below $4.50/mmbtu; European hub prices in the range $8 to $11/mmbtu and Asian LNG prices (linked contractually to oil prices) have risen to a level of around $15/mmbtu. Until recently the prevailing assumption in the oil and gas industry has been that at the post 2009 level of liquefaction costs, only Asia represents a viable market for new LNG projects. This in itself would be reason enough to undertake the research and analysis in this paper.
With the recent approval of US LNG projects, where existing re-gasification terminals are to be converted into export facilities through the incremental investment in liquefaction plant, research published by the OIES Gas Programme in 2012 described scenarios in which LNG from the US and other new or expanding supply sources might result in a world where LNG trading and arbitrage could yield sustainable hub prices (at today's development cost levels) of US: $5-6/mmbtu; Europe $10 -11/mmbtu and Asian LNG $12 -13/mmbtu.
In such a scenario an obvious issue is the very substantial competitive advantage conferred on US energy intensive industries relative to those situated in Europe and in Asian LNG markets. In terms of CO 2 emission abatement concerns, the prospects for gas in the power sector in competition with coal and in the absence of strong government policy support at such prices would appear bleak outside of North America. The key point is that the regional gas price differentials in such a scenario are directly influenced by the assumption of the continuation of today's liquefaction (and to a lesser extent shipping) costs.
In this paper Brian Songhurst assesses the reasons for the liquefaction cost level increases in the last decade by placing the available data into a framework in which an objective comparative analysis is possible. He also discusses trends in the LNG project construction and execution sector which should lead to cost reductions over time. I am grateful to Brian in the application of his considerable experience in writing this paper and also the diligence with which he undertook to gather information, views and opinions from some of the key players participating in the design, construction, operation and financing of LNG projects. Chapter 1
Context & Reason for Paper
The decade of the 2000s saw the emergence of certain developing nations, one subset often referred to as the 'BRICS' 1 , in terms of rapid economic growth. A very visible consequence of this was the rise in oil, gas and other commodity prices as these economies' import requirements disturbed the equilibria of global markets.
A less appreciated consequence of this growth acceleration, especially on the part of China and India, was the increase in the unit cost of upstream capex, power sector projects and wind turbine projects. This paper provides a comparative analysis of liquefaction plant projects sanctioned during the period 2000 to 2012 and attempts, where possible, to normalise the data (an 'apples and apples' adjustment) and isolate the primary drivers of exceptional cost base inflation responsible for the observed trends. The paper also addresses potential future scenarios which could result in a deflation of liquefaction plant costs such that they are more aligned to the trend of other EPC cost indices. In this paper liquefaction plant refers to the complete facility to treat and liquefy the gas, store the produced LNG and export it via a jetty together with the required utility systems and other necessary infrastructure. A liquefaction train refers purely to the liquefaction process train only. The curve in Figure 6 shows the trend of the metric cost by year, based on data from Wood 
Research Questions

Methodology
The following approach was used to prepare this paper:
For the liquefaction plants built since 1964 the following data was collected -plant costs, startup date, facility scope, location and capacity (tonnes/annum). These were gathered from published information and reports, industry contacts and other industry sources, including the author's own data base. The physical and process scope of the plant is a critical cost driver as projects vary enormously in this respect. Whilst they all contain a basic liquefaction unit (liquefaction train), the infrastructure -marine facilities including jetty, possible dredging and breakwater, LNG & NGL storage tanks, power station, construction camps and operations township, including possible airstrip -does vary significantly.
The costs were broken down into the key components where possible to ensure a like for like comparison. Obtaining this level of cost detail was very difficult and not always possible given the commercial confidentiality of this information.
A base liquefaction plant cost break down was established using industry published data to quantify the key cost components, namely the engineering, procurement, construction and the owner's costs.
The plant metric cost was calculated for each project and compared with data from other sources. This metric cost is used universally within the LNG industry to compare liquefaction plant costs.
The metric cost for each plant was plotted against the start-up date to determine the metric cost trend by year.
The trends were analysed using the two major cost drivers;
Scope -a new complete facility (often referred to as a 'grass roots' development) requiring the full infrastructure vs. a liquefaction train only which uses most of the existing infrastructure (often referred to as 'brownfield') Location -which drives transportation and construction costs. For example, remote locations require extensive new infrastructure for transporting equipment and personnel and accommodating construction staff compared with established industrial areas that frequently have the full infrastructure in place.
The data and the trends were analysed to predict future LNG plant costs and identify areas where future plant costs could be reduced.
The analysis and findings were reviewed by four senior LNG professionals, one from a major lending bank in the LNG industry, one from a major EPC contractor, one from a commercial LNG consultancy and one from a major LNG producer. Their comments were incorporated in this report.
Chapter 4 4.1 LNG Plant Cost Breakdown and Drivers
Cost Breakdown
Based on data collected by the author from various projects average cost breakdowns were calculated as shown in Figures 7 and 8. 
Project Scope
As stated earlier, liquefaction plants range from simple liquefaction trains added to an existing plant through to a completely new facility requiring all the necessary infrastructure, including possibly an air strip, construction camp, township, roll-on/roll-off dock, breakwater and dredging. Some projects (Gorgon and Snøhvit) even include carbon capture and storage
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. These scope changes can double or treble the plant costs for the same capacity and thus increase the metric cost dramatically. Figure 9 illustrates the range of project scopes. Scope 1 is the simplest comprising only a repeat liquefaction train with minimal gas treatment. This minimises the engineering and procurement as it is essentially just a repeat train e.g. Idku.
Scope 2 is the complete LNG facility including gas processing, liquefaction, storage and export jetty but not requiring extensive infrastructure for construction as it is close to an established town providing accommodation, port facilities and airport e.g. Darwin.
Scope 3 is the same plant scope as Scope 2 but includes the full infrastructure to support the construction and subsequent operation and maintenance of the plant, such as construction camp, new township, port facilities and airport e.g. Tangguh.
Scope 4 is the same plant scope as Scope 2 but includes the major upstream gas gathering infrastructure. In the case of the coal bed methane (CBM) projects in Queensland, this has been stated to be 50-55% of the total project cost thus doubling the cost of the project when compared with gas delivered to the gate of the liquefaction plant using an existing pipeline e.g. APLNG. Figure 10 shows the full list of processing units that may be included in a liquefaction plant. However not all plants have all these components.
Plant Units
Figure 10: Full Scope Plant
Source: KBR (2007) As an example, an expansion comprising just a repeat liquefaction train will likely only comprise the process train components. A process train taking lean gas from a sales gas pipeline will not require a slug catcher and fractionation to extract natural gas liquids. Similarly, only very sour gas facilities will require sulphur recovery. If power is available onsite then power generation will not be required. 
Marine Facilities
Marine facilities can be a very significant cost depending on the location. These typically include as a minimum the jetty head and jetty trestle linking to the shore but can also include a breakwater as well as extensive dredging to enable ships with a draft of 12 metres to enter the harbour and moor at the jetty and to turn around so they face outward in the event of having to leave in an emergency. The initial dredging costs are capital costs but ongoing maintenance can also lead to a significant operating cost. One of the projects planned for British Columbia is even considering a tunnel for running the LNG export loading lines. Tunnels are already used on import terminals in the USA and Japan but are a very costly item.
Marine facility costs are becoming so significant on many projects that they are now listed as a separate line cost item at the process plant level rather than at sub-cost element level.
An example is the proposed Wheatstone project in NW Australia shown in Figure 12 where the dredging cost is estimated at A$1.5 billion. This includes the dredging of a 17 km approach channel, a manoeuvring area, the berthing pockets and the tug harbour. The total dredged volume will exceed 26 million m³ of material and the works will be executed under strict environmental conditions. 
Project Complexity
Projects can vary from relatively straight forward locations with a highly structured in-country LNG business and well established industrialised areas, for example Qatar and the Gulf of Mexico, through less straight forward locations in countries which already have a highly established LNG business but are using very remote locations with no infrastructure, for example Gorgon on Barrow Island, to very difficult countries which are completely new to the LNG business and using remote locations with no infrastructure, for example Mozambique and Tanzania.
These differences increase the level of complexity of executing the project as the challenges become more difficult and therefore significantly increase the cost of managing the project. In particular, the cost and time of undertaking activities prior to making the investment decision will be much higher.
With regard to the countries new to LNG, for example Angola recently and in the future Mozambique and Tanzania, they will not have national standards for LNG plants and there will be an extensive period of familiarisation and local training before all the local stakeholders know their role and are able to approve the project 6 .
Another area of complexity is the use of multiple front end engineering contracts (FEEDs) and often referred to as design competitions to select the EPC contractor. In these situations, 2 or 3 EPC contractors are awarded the FEED phase and, based on a functional specification, are requested to prepare their EPC proposal based on their FEED. These multiple FEED teams require multiple client teams to interface with the different contractors to ensure all the proposals meet the client's requirements. The use of a single FEED contractor to provide the basis for competitive EPC bids is far less complex and the use of a preferred contractor from the outset for the whole project is even simpler and reduces the client pre-sanction costs considerably as well as shortening the project schedule.
Other complexity issues include environmental and permitting issues and multiple owners with different specifications and contracting strategies.
Construction
Construction costs are the major single cost and typically represent 30% of the total project cost as shown in figure 8. For Australian projects this can increase to 50-60% as discussed later.
A new build (grass roots) liquefaction plant typically requires a construction team of 6-8,000 people for a period of 4 years, representing 30 million site construction manhours 7 . Labour rates and productivity has a major impact on this cost. Marine facilities, as mentioned earlier, including long jetties, large breakwaters and extensive dredging, can increase the costs significantly.
The cost of construction is primarily driven by plant location and is a combination of construction manhours, labour costs and productivity.
As stated above, the historic figure of 30% of total project cost was based on pre-Australian projects. Current Australian project construction costs are typically 2-3 times higher than for other locations and this has increased the construction component to a staggering 50-60% of the project cost 8 . This alone has put a question mark on future land based LNG projects in Australia and floating liquefaction is now being considered as an alternative and Shell has selected FLNG for Prelude and Woodside has now moved to a FLNG concept for Browse 9 .
Australian Costs
As Australian costs are so high and significant to this paper it is worth mentioning the following items taken from recent reports:
Australia has become such a high-cost and low-productivity nation that resources projects are now 40% more expensive to deliver than in the US, jeopardising an investment boom that is crucial to propping up the national economy 
Equipment & Materials
Equipment and bulk material costs typically represent 30% and 20% of a liquefaction project respectively. The main equipment costs are the cryogenic heat exchangers, refrigeration compressors and drivers, power plant and LNG storage tanks. As a general observation it can be said that in these relatively specialised areas there is limited competition. The refrigeration compressors and their gas turbine driver are supplied exclusively by General Electric, despite major efforts by Dresser, Siemens and Rolls-Royce to break into this market and increase competition.
The typical suppliers of the main equipment items are:
Cryogenic It should be noted that most of the other equipment is standard oil and gas equipment and should not be more expensive for LNG projects. The exception to this is an extensive use of stainless steel for equipment and materials including piping that handles LNG at cryogenic conditions (typically -160 0 C). Stainless steel is considerably more expensive than carbon steel.
An interesting characteristic of the recent plants in Australia is that the major suppliers have been asked to modularize their equipment 15 to minimize construction work at the site due to the high costs and personnel restrictions (i.e. labour union-backed laws which limit the import of skilled trades for construction projects) 16 . Feedback indicates that while companies such as GE are excellent at providing world class gas turbines and compressors, modularization is not their area of expertise. This has led to high costs and extended schedules for work that could be performed more effectively by a specialist fabricator who is able to design and fabricate modules more cheaply and quickly. This area is discussed further in suggestions for cost reduction.
Engineering & Project Management
Engineering and Project Management (EPM) typically represents 8% of the project cost (capex) and covers the detailed engineering and project and construction management costs of the EPC contractor.
There are six main EPC contractors providing world scale LNG plants -Bechtel, KBR, Foster Wheeler, Technip, CB&I, JGC and Chiyoda.
All are located in the major oil and gas design centres of the world -London, Paris, Houston and Tokyo. They all have similar productivity and cost base (labour costs) and all use high value design centres to reduce costs for detailed design and drafting. These are typically located in India, Mexico and the Philippines.
It should be noted that these contractors are all active in other oil and gas facilities such as upstream, refineries and petrochemicals and use the same professional human resource 'pool' other than for some specialist LNG engineers. As such the cost of the E&PM services should rise in line with normal oil and gas escalation and not carry an LNG premium.
Owner's Costs
These costs typically include the costs of the owner's project team and support services to oversee all aspects of the project both technically and commercially from project commencement to handover to the operations department. They include the cost of all specialist contractors and consultants used during the period prior to Final Investment Decision (FID) for activities such as feasibility studies, conceptual design, front end engineering design (FEED), environmental impact assessment studies, drawing up commercial contracts for the purchase of the feed gas and the sale of LNG, working with the project financiers (banks) and the government organisations and other approval bodies for permitting.
These activities and their sequence are described in Figure 14 .
For major liquefaction projects the likely overall schedule is 10 years from initial planning stage to plant start-up. Construction normally takes 4 years. Owner's costs typically represent 10% of the project cost but vary greatly depending on the owner's involvement, driven mainly by the complexity of the project. Prior to this period of high cost projects, owners typically had only small teams of around 40 but recent complex projects have increased this number to 200, i.e. by a factor of 5 or even more. This increase has been due to the higher complexity of the projects and, in many cases, due to an increase in the number of partners.
As stated earlier, there has also been a tendency to award multiple FEED contracts as 'design competitions' to 2 or 3 EPC contractors and this has increased owner's costs and extended the schedules when compared with the sole sourced route previously used. Managing three contractors undertaking a design competition typically means three client teams located in the contractors' offices, typically in different parts of the world, leading to a significant increase in costs and a high demand on the industry's resources. These personnel could be managing and working on other projects.
In addition, the move from lump sum EPC contracts towards EPCM contracts (construction management only) with construction costs awarded on a reimbursable basis has led to much larger client teams in order to manage this reimbursable component.
It is not unusual now for the owner to spend in excess of $1 billion on a project costing $15-20 billion prior to project sanction (FID), representing 5-6% of the investment cost.
Contract Strategy
This can vary from the award of a single sole sourced negotiated EPC contract through to the bidding and award of separate contracts for marine, tanks, plant and infrastructure facilities. As mentioned earlier, multiple FEED (front end design) contracts have been awarded as design competitions again adding considerable project cost and drawing heavily on resources.
Several approaches to the award of the subsequent EPC contract or contracts are used by the different energy companies. These include, in order of increasing cost:
The simplest and lowest cost of award method of developing a high level Basis of Design and the award to an EPC contractor on a sole sourced basis.
The traditional and mid cost method of awarding single conceptual design and FEED contracts to define the scope of the project as the basis for bidding the EPC contract. This is followed by seeking competitive bids from typically 3 different EPC contractors, evaluating those bids, negotiating the contract and award to the selected contractor.
The relatively new high cost 'functional specification' method of developing a high level Basis of Design through a feasibility study which then forms the basis of a FEED or design competition awarded to 2 or 3 EPC contractors. The results of these competitions are evaluated and the EPC contract is awarded to the successful contractor.
Due to the high value of these contracts, consortia are often formed by the EPC contractors to spread the risk and utilise specific contractor strengths such as in-country knowledge. This increases the complexity and management costs of the project.
With regard to the main liquefaction process, most energy companies pre-select this as part of the basis of design. In most cases it is based on their previous experience and operational knowledge thus allowing trained teams to be easily relocated to new projects.
Some interesting comments that have been made during the research for this paper are:
Where there are multiple liquefaction projects on adjacent sites, for example Curtis Island, Queensland and now Mozambique, costs could be significantly reduced by sharing the common infrastructure for the overall facility as opposed to completely independent facilities. This could include the utilities, jetty and marine facilities.
FEED packages tend to focus on the liquefaction plant rather than inlet gas treatment which is more liable to change following FID, escalating costs with changing inlet conditions and composition.
In the EPCM (reimbursable construction) environment the major contractor tends to give less scrutiny to the FEED package, which remains the responsibility of the Owner, as all further changes are reimbursable and thus income generating. For a lump sum EPC contract the contractor needs to take ownership of the FEED package at the outset.
12 Contractor Profit & Risk
It is understood that many major contractors did not realise their expected profit margins on lump sum EPC projects in the period 2005-2008 due mainly to increasing costs and highly competitive bidding 17 . As a result they moved from the lump sum EPC contract model to EPCM where the construction management is included in the lump sum but the actual cost of construction is reimbursable. The reason was to eliminate the risk due to rapidly escalating construction costs in high cost areas like Australia.
There are currently 7 major world scale LNG plant EPC contractors worldwide, which ensures competitive bidding. Further, other contractors are looking to enter this market, including WorleyParsons which has just been awarded the FEED for the Vladivostok liquefaction plant and Black & Veatch which is offering larger 1.5 mtpa plants using electric motor drives. This would further increase competition and this is discussed later under areas for possible cost reduction.
In addition, further competition is now coming into the market from the suppliers of floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) such as Excelerate Energy and EXMAR. These companies are offering inshore barge mounted liquefaction units at much lower costs than onshore facilities. The EXMAR barge for Pacifica Rubiales in Columbia is small at only 0.5 mtpa and is being constructed in China at a quoted metric of $700/tpa, which is very low when compared with traditional onshore plants.
The proposed Excelerate Energy barge for Port Lavaca is larger at 4 mtpa and more closely resembles an onshore plant capacity. It will be built in Korea and has been quoted at a cost of $600/tpa. Please note these are inshore rather than offshore units and they are essentially onshore plants built on a barge in a shipyard with lower unit costs. Storage is provided in the hull and the export tanker comes alongside for loading.
For deeper water gas field monetisation Shell is currently constructing its Prelude floating liquefaction vessel to produce 3.6 mtpa in the Timor Sea and Petronas is constructing its Kanowit vessel to produce 1.2 mtpa offshore Sarawak. A second vessel for Petronas is about to be awarded. This competing technology provides further competition by bringing new contractors (the shipyards) into the market.
13 Currency Exchange Risk
Currency exchange costs have been quoted as a significant contributor to the increased project costs in Australia and PNG. The Australian dollar has risen by 20% against the US dollar since 2009 and this is significant as typically 50% of the project costs (mainly construction) are in local currency. The strengthening of the Australian dollar since 2004 is shown in Figure 15 .
Chevron has stated that this increase in the Australian dollar will account for at least one-third of the $9 billion increase in costs -a currency increase of $3 billion in a $48 billion project, representing an increase of 6% for currency exchange 
Plant Scope -Expansion vs. Complete Facility (Grass Roots)
The next step of the analysis was to classify the costs by scope to try and compare the projects on a like for like basis. As stated earlier, the physical scope of the plant is a major cost driver and projects vary enormously. Figure 17 divides the plants into two major groups -the expansions where just a liquefaction train or trains were installed and those comprising a complete LNG plant facility, including the process plant, storage, jetty and utilities. Until 1995 all liquefaction plants were new 'grass roots' facilities. The first expansion was undertaken at the Malaysian LNG plant in 1995 and the cost was lower than the original grass roots plant, as would be expected. The expansions since then, as shown by the red diamonds, are all at a lower cost due to their reduced scope. Analysis of past projects indicates that the liquefaction train only represents 66% of a complete grass roots facility or, put another way, the addition of the storage, jetty and utilities adds a further 50% to the base liquefaction plant cost. Figure 18 circles all the recent high cost projects with the exception of Snøhvit and they are all located in Australia and PNG, with the exception of Angola. Regarding the Australian projects, these exceptionally high costs reflect the very complex nature of the projects, their remote location and their being built where construction costs are regarded as some of the highest in the world. The same is true for PNG where costs are similar to Australia and the project is complex with local land ownership and workforce issues and a remote location with limited infrastructure.
Location
As an example, the cost of a welder in Australia has been quoted at A$250,000/year, which is double the cost of a similar welder in Qatar, Singapore or the USA 20 . Similarly, LNG tanks recently constructed in Australia cost twice as much as the same tanks recently built in Singapore
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.
Most Australian LNG projects have exceeded their original budget by 30%. Gorgon has recently cancelled its expansion and Browse has moved from an onshore plant to a floating barge.
The Snøhvit project at $2,000/tpa is regarded as very complex, located on a remote island in Northern Norway and using a new liquefaction process. This was very much a unique project and much has been reported in the LNG press about the challenges that the project faced
22
The Angola project has its own particular problems and suffered significant delays, adding to the cost. Care needs to be taken with estimating the cost of the proposed projects in Mozambique and Tanzania and any applicable learning from Angola should be applied. 
Trends Excluding the High Cost Projects
If the high cost projects (mostly Australian) are excluded, as shown in Figure 19 , and the current expected outturn costs for Sabine Pass, Malaysian LNG Train 9 and Donggi (which are all under construction) are included, then the cost increase of 120% over the period 2000-2012 is more in line with escalation in the upstream oil and gas industry, as reported by the UCCI index and referred to in chapter 1 (figure 3). The red line indicates the trend for process trains only and the blue line for the complete facility on the basis of being 50% higher than the stand alone process train.
These trends would indicate a current cost metric of $800/tpa for liquefaction trains only and $1200/tpa for complete facilities. 
High Cost and Normal Cost Projects
Hence the costs can be divided into 2 groupings as shown in figure 20 -high cost projects and normal cost projects. Hence estimating the costs for planned projects will be highly dependent on the location and will favour the low cost industrial areas, for example the USA, over Australia. This impact is shown in figure 21 .
Figure 21: Major Australian LNG Projects
Sources: Access Economics, BREE, company reports, ANZ
Summary
The continuous line drawn through the Australian and PNG plants in Figure 16 is not an accurate representation of cost trends for future predictions for all locations as it ignores the expected much lower outturn costs for Sabine Pass, USA, Malaysian LNG Train 9 and Donggi, Indonesia, which are also under construction. The group of inherently high cost projects is unique to Australia and PNG and other locations that are complex and have very high cost bases.
The projected costs for Sabine Pass, Malaysian LNG Train 9 and Donggi are far more in line with normal upstream oil and gas plant as recently reported, as shown on figure 20.
This will favour future LNG plant projects being located in the USA to take advantage of the lower cost base and the availability of lower cost shale gas production.
Projects in other proposed locations, for example Yamal in Siberia, Mozambique and Tanzania and Canada (British Columbia) are likely to be closer to the higher cost base due to their location and complexity.
Chapter 6 6.1 Areas for Future Plant Cost Reductions
The following are areas in which the cost of LNG plants could be reduced Plant scope, as typically measured by equipment count, can increase by a factor of 4 from a simple base liquefaction train to a complete facility including storage, utilities and export jetty. Cost can further increase with the addition of infrastructure such as a construction camp, township and airstrip. In the case of the coal bed methane projects in Queensland, the cost of the gas gathering system has been stated to be equal to that of the plant facilities, which doubles the project cost.
The very high cost of the current Australian projects is unique to that location and driven by a strengthening Australian dollar against the US dollar, the very high construction costs (which have been quoted as high as 2-3 times that of USA Gulf Coast costs) and the remote locations, far from any major infrastructure.
The high Australian plant costs are not reflected in the plants currently under construction in the USA, Malaysia and Indonesia. The increases in USA, Malaysian and Indonesian plants reflect cost increases over the 2005-2012 period of approximately 100% and similar to those experienced in the upstream oil and gas industry generally and not the 200% experienced for the Australian projects. This rapid rise in Australian costs has led to future projects being shelved or consideration being given to floating LNG facilities that can be fabricated at a lower cost location such as Korea and China.
An example of this move towards floating liquefaction is the recent decision by Woodside and its partners on the Browse project to move to FLNG on the basis of lower cost. Inshore floating liquefaction plants are also a possibility, as proposed for Port Lavaca, Texas where the LNG barge cost appears cheaper than the onshore Sabine Pass project. An inshore barge is also under construction by EXMAR for the Pacific Rubiales project in Colombia where the cost has been stated as $700/tpa which is similar to that quoted for Port Lavaca. A second EXMAR unit is being considered for British Columbia, Canada.
LNG plant metric costs are essentially driven by two major factors -the scope (liquefaction only or a complete facility) and the location where local costs are the major driver. Figure 22 shows the cost patterns diagrammatically. The typical metric costs given in Figure 23 are indicative only. A cost estimate must be prepared to address the specifics of each project as 'no two plants are ever created equal.'
In summary, the following opportunities exist for reducing plant costs:
Barge mounted plant built in a shipyard
Using alternate processes and EPC contractors Bringing in competition to GE for the refrigeration compressors and their drivers
Utilising the synergies between projects located adjacent to each other and sharing common facilities
Simpler contracting strategies to reduce the number of contracts None of these represents a 'silver bullet' which will radically reduce liquefaction costs overnight. Whilst we might have reasonable expectations that these might work to the advantage of US LNG export projects, in other key locations such as East Africa, Canada and the Russian Arctic factors such as the lack of existing infrastructure, availability of skilled labour and in some cases specific locational challenges might be expected to maintain upward pressure on costs.
Name Country Number Trains
Train Capacity mtpa Total Production mtpa
Start-up Glossary
Bcfd -Billion cubic feet per day. A flowrate or production output of typically natural gas commonly used in North America.
Bcma -Billion cubic metres per annum. A flowrate or production output of natural gas commonly used internationally.
Capex -Industry term for Capital Expenditure
Coal Bed Methane -methane produced from wells drilled into coal seams allowing the methane to desorb from natural fractures (clints) in the coal and from the coal matrix after a period of de-watering. Also known as 'coal seam gas'.
EPC -Engineering, Procurement and Construction
Eng & PM -Engineering and Project Management FEED -Front End Engineering Design FID -Final Investment Decision -Typically made by the investors in an LNG project when all necessary sales contracts and other government and regulatory approvals are in place. Liquefaction -The process by which pre-treated natural gas is cooled to minus 160 0 Celsius when it becomes a liquid at atmospheric pressure.
LNG -Liquefied Natural Gas
Metric Cost -In many instances in this paper a 'metric cost' is used to describe a measure used to compare the relative costs of different liquefaction projects.
Natural Gas Liquids -Typically the ethane, propane, butane and higher alkanes occurring within a natural gas reservoir extracted from the methane in the course of processing it to grid or liquefaction specification.
NBP -The UK gas market trading hub (virtual location) tpa, mtpa -Tonnes per annum, Million tonnes per annum.
UCCI -Upstream Capital Cost Index
